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meritorious his disability claim, the less likely he will be able to do
those things necessary to prosecute his case effectively. His inability to
work will often prevent him from hiring counsel, and that same
difficulty will make his search for witnesses and other evidence a very
difficult task. However, the courts may be able to avoid a rigorous
rule requiring counsel if they are careful, as was the Sixth Circuit in
Webb, not to deny routinely a request for a remand for the taking of
additional evidence. A claimant, finally desperate enough to secure
representation, should not be denied a proper hearing where he was
initially beset by age, disability, lack of education, or lack of
intelligence. Additionally, the examiner's duty of fair inquiry into the
issues before him might be broadly construed to demand that the
relative complexity of the issues before him be examined with a view
toward discerning whether counsel is necessary in a given case. At
least the claimant could then be encouraged to seek help from the
private bar or an appropriate legal aid agency if the examiner so
recommended.
Right to Hearing in License Renewal Proceeding when Allegation
is the Subject of Concurrent Rule-making Proceeding
In Hale v. FCC"6 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that section 309(e) of the Communications
Act5 7 does not require the FCC to grant a hearing in a license renewal
proceeding to petitioners whose allegations of the licensee's violations
of the "fairness doctrine" and of excess concentration of media
ownership were not supported by the required specific factual
instances of harm to the public. Private citizens challenging the
proposed renewal of the license of KSL-AM radio station, held by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon Church)
through KSL, Inc., alleged that the licensee had violated the FCC's
"fairness doctrine" and that the church's extensive holdings of other
communications media in the area gave it a concentration of power
56. 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). Section 309(e) reads in relevant part:
If, in the case of any application to which subsection (a) of this section applies [to
authorize renewal of licenses], a substantial and material question of fact is presented or
the Commission for any reason is unable to make the finding [that the public interest
would be served], it shall formally designate the application for hearing. . ..
58. FCC, Application of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Information, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
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harmful to the public.-9 The allegations of violations of the "fairness
doctrine," however, were not supported by any showing of specific
instances of refusal on the part of the licensee to grant time for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints after programming an issue of
a controversial nature. Absent such a showing, the petitioners failed
to meet the FCC standard for raising material questions of fact that
would entitle them to a hearing under section 309(e) of the
Communications Act. 60 Although the petitioners' allegation of excess
media concentration resulting from the conglomerate holdings 1 of the
* Mormon Church in the KSL-AM listening area was uncontested, it
failed to raise the specific factual instances of harm to the public as
required by FCC hearing standards. Thus, because of the insufficient
evidence offered by the petitioners on both issues, the FCC refused to
grant a hearing. 62 After a subsequent denial of a petition for
reconsideration,6 petitioners brought this action to compel a hearing;
the court of appeals affirmed the Commission decision.
The present requirements for obtaining a formal hearing to protest
license renewals are fashioned to prevent abuse of the protest process
and to insure, consideration of the public interest." Because of
abuses, 5 the FCC has tended to restrict access to hearings by
59. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, .240, .636 (1970), for the FCC's rules concerning multiple
ownership. These rules limit a licensee's ownership to seven stations in a broadcast category.
The three broadcast categories are television, AM radio, and FM radio. In addition, no two
stations in any category may have overlapping broadcast areas. Joint ownership of newspapers
and stations, however, is not limited.
60. When a complaint is filed on the basis of the fairness doctrine, the Commission expects
the complainant to submit specific information indicating:
(1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature
discussed over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the basis
for the claim that the station has presented only one side of the question; and (5) whether
the station has afforded, or has plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of
contrasting viewpoints.
FCC, supra note 58, at 10416.
61. The church, in addition to the AM radio license being challenged, owns television and
FM broadcast licenses in Salt Lake City. One of Salt Lake City's two daily newspapers is
controlled by the Church. Also, through its ownership of Brigham Young University, the
Church controls an educational TV-FM Complex in Provo, Utah. 425 F.2d at 559 n.7.
62. KSL, Inc., 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 458,460,464-65 (FCC 1969).
63. Id. at 460.
64. For an example of what considerations might constitute the public interest, see Citizens
Comm. v. FCC, No. 23,515 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 1970), which held that an application for the
transfer of a radio station license in which the proposed transferee would change the station's
programming, thereby leaving the broadcast area without classical music, presented substantial
material questions of fact regarding the public interest and thereby required a formal hearing on
the application under section 309(e) of the Communications Act.
65. See Fisher, Communications Act Amendments, 1952-An Attempt to Legislate
Administrative Fairness, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 672, 682 (1957).
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imposing strict standing66 and pleading 7 standards, and the 1960
amendments to the Communications Act,68 the latest attempt at
enacting an efficient and equitable protest procedure, retained most of
these earlier standards. Traditionally, standing was limited to parties
in interest or competitors69 who could demonstrate that the grant of
the license in question would cause electrical interference 70 or
economic injury. 71 After a protestant demonstrated his standing, he
then had to plead aprimafacie12 case based on facts known by him to
be true73 that tended to show that the grant of the license would not
serve the public interest. 74 Only if these rigorous standing and pleading
requirements were met would a material question of fact be presented,
entitling the protestant to a hearing as a matter of right.75
The appellants in the Hale case, having been accorded standing
under Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 76 which broadened standing rules to include responsible
members of the public as "parties in interest," sought to challenge the
renewal of the KSL license on two grounds: that such renewal would
violate the FCC's "fairness doctrine" and that the concentration of
media ownership by the Mormon Church in the immediate
geographical area was in and of itself harmful to the public interest.
The first ground was futile because of insufficient facts alleged to
establish an infraction of the "fairness doctrine. '7 The excess
concentration allegations, however, by showing a media
66. See Hazelwood, Inc., 7 F.C.C. 443, 444-45 (1939); Fischer, supra note 65, at 683.
67. Fischer, supra note 65, at 687.
68. 74 Stat. 889, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1964).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1964).
70. See NBC v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943); S. REp.
No. 44, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
71. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
72. Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., I P & F RADIO REG. 2 D 1, 3-4 (FCC 1963).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1964); WFTL Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 710,
712 (FCC 1965); WGRY, Inc., 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 718, 720 (FCC 1964).
74. Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., I P & F RADIo REG. 2D 1, 4 (FCC 1963).
75. See Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 375 F.2d 299, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
76. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Project, Federal Administrative Law
Developments-] 969, 1970 DuKE L.J. 67, 243-44.
77. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. There is a distressing side-light to the court's
determination that insufficient facts had been alleged to justify an FCC hearing on the "fairness
doctrine" issue. From their initial correspondence with the Commission, petitioners Hale and
Wharton -a waitress and a taxicab driver, respectively-persistently expressed their uncertainty
over the procedures they should follow in opposing the renewal of the KSL license. Letter from
Ethel C. Hale & W. Paul Wharton to Mr. Ben Waple, July 29, 1968, in FCC File BR-4081.
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conglomeration, yet failing to plead specific instances of harm to the
public, would force a consideration of the propriety and wisdom of
the agency's multiple ownership rules in light of antitrust issues. Tie
FCC declined the requested hearing because no basis for ad hoc
action against the licensee was set forth in the pleadings and because
a challenge to the ownership rule 78 would be better handled in a rule-
making proceeding currently underway." Appellants, thus, were
essentially asking the court to hold that the fact of concentration,
without more, is enough to require a hearing to determine whether the
license renewal would serve the public interest. In effect, they wanted
to use the hearing as a device to challenge present FCC ownership
rules at a time when the agency was conducting a comprehensive
review of those policies in a rule-making proceeding.
By affirming the decision of the FCC and accepting the validity of
the rules upon which that decision was based, the Hale court
determined that a rule-making proceeding. was a more desirable
Shortly after the FCC renewed KSL's license, Mrs. Hale and Mr. Wharton petitioned for
reconsideration, saying:
[W]e are unsure, now as before, about proper procedure, and do not know whether
response from us is appropriate ...
• . . We reiterate that we are without counsel, but emphasize that we have stated we
are poor, without counsel, and not trained in law. . . . Letter from Ethel C. Hale & W.
Paul Wharton to Mr. Ben Waple, Dec. 7, 1968, in FCC File BR-408 1.
The court of appeals displayed a lack of sensitivity to the realities of trying to participate in
agency's activities. While noting appellants' claimed inability to monitor KSL's programs
because no daily logs were published in local newspapers, the court pointed out that the logs
would have been available on request under 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.111-.116 (1970). Just how
app llants were supposed to know this fact, the court failed to mention-the FCC certainly did
not volunteer the information. Only Judge Tamm, in his concurring opinion, recognized the
appellants' predicament. 425 F.2d at 563. Yet, in its haste to handle the monopolistic aspects of
the case, the court seemingly ignored the statement by Mrs. Hale and Mr. Wharton that they
had "no means to solicit local help, although we have substantial reason to believe that large
numbers of persons would approve our stand. . . if economic reprisal could be avoided." Letter
from Ethel C. Hale & W. Paul Wharton to Mr. Ben Waple, Oct. 15, 1968, in FCC File BR-
4081.
78. For a discussion of the criteria necessary to challenge agency rules in court, see United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
79. 425 F.2d at 560. Since the instant decision the Commission has announced changes in
the ownership concentration rules. Ownership of one station in a broadcast area will now bar
acquisition of additional stations of any type; however, divestment of present overlapping
stations is not required, and the numerical limits on total holdings remain unchanged. Renewal
of present licenses is allowed, and favoritism to the licensee in competitive renewals is continued.
Joint ownership of broadcast facilities and newspapers remains unregulated by the FCC.
However, notice was given of possible future changes in the policies on divestment and
newspaper ownership. 1970 Rules on Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Stations, 18 P & F
RADIO REG. 2D 1735 (FCC 1970).
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forum for challenging these agency standards than an agency hearing
or trial. The majority agreed that the FCC's policy" of changing rules
through rule-making proceedings rather than ad hoc hearings or
adjudication was rational, in that the rule-making proceeding allows
all interested parties to be present, permits a more thorough
investigation into the subject, and allows the agency, rather than a
court, to set policy. 8' It also noted that an inquiry into the subject of
conglomerate media holdings was currently underway although there
was no intimation as to the effect an absence of such inquiry would
have had on the decision. 82 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge
Tamm conditioned his vote with the majority on the fact that the FCC
was undertaking a review of its policy towards media concentration.8
He felt that the threat against first amendment rights and
dissemination of information afforded by the common ownership of
the news media in any geographical area represented sufficient
potential danger to the public to warrant a hearing without specific
showing of harm. Also, citing the second Church of Christ decision, u
Judge Tamm asserted that if that case gave a reasonable right of
intervention in agency hearings to members of the public, possible
intervenors, who are generally neither skilled in legal matters nor well
financed, ought not be required to meet the substantial barriers
erected by the FCC rules. His perception of the first amendment and
public intervention issues was sufficiently strong to warrant requiring
the agency to reconsider certain of its rules in an ad hoc hearing if the
FCC had not already been reviewing those rules in a separate
proceeding.m
The Hale court's recognition of the need for an FCC policy
decision on the problems of ownership concentration was well
founded. When the ramifications to the broadcast industry of possible
changes in the ownership rules are taken into account, the necessity of
permitting other industry members to present their views in a rule-
80. See Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. Rsv. 485, 487 (1970).
81. 425 F.2d at 560.
82. A subsequent decision adopted a similar approach of judicial abstention in light of the
rule-making proceedings that were underway. See Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
83. 425 F.2d at 560 (ramm, J., concurring).
84. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
85. See 425 F.2d at 560 (Tamm, J., concurring).
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making hearing becomes apparent. In addition, agency rule making
has other advantages over adjudication.8" First, the agencies are
generally staffed with experts in the field of regulation in which they
operate, an expertise seldom enjoyed by the courts." Second, the
agencies, becauise of the wide discretion given to them as regulatory
bodies, have a more comprehensive range of remedies available at
their disposal s Third, judicial intervention could severely limit the
discretion needed by the agencies to provide supervisory and
managerial functions. And, finally, the ability of the agency to act
informally makes it a more suitable forum for eliciting the
information needed to formulate broad policy judgments, such as the
degree of conglomerate media ownership that should be permitted.
Judge Tamm's observations as to the need for judicial scrutiny of
agency rules, however, are not without merit. If representatives of the
public are to have a meaningful right of intervention on matters of
excess concentration of ownership, their right should not depend on
the FCC changing its own pleading rules but rather should be
guaranteed by the courts." The Hale court, then, by balancing the
competing interests of agency discretion and individual rights found
in this instance that the practical effects and inherent advantages of
rulemaking, especially at a time when the rules were being reviewed,
would better resolve the issues of ownership concentration of
broadcast media than would agency adjudication.
V. ANCILLARY MATTERS
Intervention in Agency Proceedings
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' the Federal Trade Commission
permitted a consumer-interest organization to intervene in forma
pauperis in an adjudicatory proceeding involving charges of deceptive
advertising with respect to the price and safety of Firestone tires. The
86. See generally Fuchs, The New Administrative State: Judicial Sanction for Agency Self-
Determination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 216 (1969) (discussion of the
various advantages of agency determination over court adjudication).
87. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367, 382 (1968).
88. See id. at 380.
89. See id. at 387.
90. 425 F.2d at 565-66; Fuchs, supra note 86.
1. 27 AD. L.2d 877 (FTC 1970).
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